Photo: lining up of 155 mm shells in preparation for a live fire of the 155 mm howitzer cannon during 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery’s field training exercise in the USA © Spc. Michael Blalack, US Army Alaska, Yukon Training Area, 2010
As part of the “iDeaS By Coges Events” series organized and presented by Hawa-Léa Sougouna, Head of Conferences at GOGES, a panel on capability cooperation was held on April 18, bringing together two experts:
The discussion was moderated by General John G. Ferrari (R), Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Also a graduate of the Wharton School (MBA in Management), the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (MA in Natural Resource Strategy) and West Point (BS in Computer Science), General (R) Ferrari served in the US Army for thirty-two years, including deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
The aim of this discussion was to compare the American approach to surge production capacity – with the specific emphasis placed on certain industrial capabilities by the Biden administration through the Defense Production Act, a law that dates back to the Korean War in 1950 and authorizes the executive branch to direct and prioritize national production for defense and security purposes – and the German approach of strategic breakthrough (“Zeitenwende”), alluding to German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz’s speech on February 22, 2022, in which he acknowledged a “change of era”.
If, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the return of high-intensity warfare to the heart of the Old Continent, there is on both sides the same political will to overhaul defense industrial capabilities towards greater joint cooperation, the impact on their respective production systems differs on the banks of the Potomac and on the banks of the Rhine.
Relaunching intensive production means revisiting the interactions of different levels of subcontractors and production facilities, whose supply chain is often international. This approach poses a number of challenges: “. the key is to send out a clear signal to companies so that they can produce on a large scale. But even once this message has been sent, a waiting period remains necessary to determine where, when and how to implement the power ramp-up. “Dr. Cook has identified three essential stages in the process:
While Cynthia Cook notes that increased production is already being felt in certain sectors of the defense industry, such as 155 mm shells [Editor’s note: production rate was 14,000 shells per month last April, and should rise to 100,000 per month by 2025], she believes that despite a strong signal on the demand side, companies are still hesitant to invest without a guarantee of financing behind them. She highlights the following obstacles:
The optimization of previous decades led to a genuine revolution on the supply side, but the ability to deliver equipment on short notice was sacrificed on the altar of the ” just in time ” : “ faster production means more staff, more production space, new machine tools, and therefore more funding “Without even mentioning the time required for a change of scale, this is where the problem lies, as ” the major constraint is the inability of the ecosystem in general to meet this demand ”. The industries ” need the guarantee of a return on investment” and the longer-term visibility that only multi-year contracts can provide. ” Congress tends to fund on an annual basis so as not to tie the hands of future Congresses, except when it comes to funding platforms that take years to build, like aircraft carriers for example.”
Cynthia Cook notes, however, that a major new development in ammunition contracts, which are traditionally drawn up on an annual basis and regularly sacrificed for other priorities in military budgets, is the adoption for the first time of multi-year contracts in this sector. In response to a question from General Ferrari about the US declared intention to relocate the production of certain equipment with common standards to Central and Eastern Europe, in order to contribute to the creation of a European defense industrial base and standardization of the supply chain, Dr. Cook was cautious about a systematic approach to US imports of European weapons, and about the promises of ” off-shoring [Editor’s note: ” off-shoring “or ” friend-shoring ” is a concept developed in 2022 in the aftermath of Covid and Russian aggression in Ukraine by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and intended to strengthen the resilience of the ” supply chain “. It consists in deglobalizing and relocating production to countries sharing the same values (1)].
” One of the questions we need to ask ourselves when we talk about increasing power is whether we want to replenish the stocks of equipment transferred to Ukraine, whether we want to replenish with the same equipment we have been storing, or whether we want to buy new-generation equipment. “. For Cook, the answer is mixed, meaning that it makes sense to invest in the latter, while encouragingoffshoring for materials already produced worldwide, such as 155 mm shells. ” This requires political will on the part of the United States, but the question is whether Europe is prepared to invest accordingly to increase its munitions production capacity … “Ammunition has always been a minor financial priority and the scenarios developed by CSIS, where Dr Cook works, underline a great vulnerability in this area: ” in the event of a conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait, simulations tend to show that the armed forces would run out of long-range precision-guided munitions after one week of combat, while stocks of ammunitions in general would be exhausted after three weeks ” (2).
As far as obstacles to international production are concerned, there are a number of solutions already in place: the thorny issue of intellectual property, for example, can be the subject of a ” “ modular open system approach “, in which common interfaces enable companies wishing to work together on a joint capability to connect, while ensuring proper management of state-owned intellectual property.
For Cynthia Cook, what is fundamental is that the horror of the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of alliances and partnerships, which should not be underestimated and for which we ought to be grateful.
Since then, Germany has focused on reaping peace dividends by demilitarizing with the belief that ” if you worked with Russia, peace would be assured “. The invasion of Ukraine radically altered such a perception, and put an end to the vision that had prevailed for the last thirty years, or even the last seventy ones.
Chancellor Scholtz’s speech thus suggests a fundamental break in doctrine, based on the idea that ” peace can no longer be made with the Russians, but against them “and that Germany must be guarantor of European security “by working to increase Germany’s territorial defense, as well as that of Europe in cooperation with its European allies. Bindenagel notes that “the Dutch have already integrated part of their forces with the German armed forces “, while for Central European countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, homeland defense is inconceivable without German support. In his view, announcing a budget of one hundred billion euros for defense and respecting the NATO principle of 2% of GNP for defense is literally “earth shattering“. But there’s still a long way to go, as ” the Germans are in a very bad position, probably even worse than you can imagine, as they have to relearn the concept of high-intensity warfare “.
According to military experts, Germany would not even be able to mobilize ” a single operational brigade to defend its territory “and does not have a defense industrial base per seexplains James Bindenhagel, pointing out that even if the political will is there, and the budget too, ramping up capabilities will not happen overnight. However, he is confident in the success of such an ambition, stressing out the speed with which Berlin ended its excessive energy dependence on Russia, a transition characteristic of German decision-making: ” the way Germans make decisions is very slow, but once a decision is made, they do implement it. ”.
In fact, he underscores an already radical shift in public opinion, from the traditional anti-militarist stance of 60-70% of the population to a mere 40% unfavorable to “military matters” in barely a year (3).
In response to a question from General (R ) Ferrari as to Germany’s contribution to the standardization of European equipment, James Bindenhagel was optimistic about the new long-term funding allocated by the European Union in the form of Eurobonds in the wake of the Covid years, as part of the MFF (” Multiannual Financial Framework ” (4)): ” such an initiative could increase capabilities and support NATO with a better balance between Europe and the United States “.
The fundamental question addressed in conclusion by the former career diplomat is how to deter Russia from further aggression, and the answer is to back up the negotiations with adequate military support:” diplomacy without arms is like an orchestra without musical instruments”, he recalled, adding: “it will take a few years to strengthen transatlantic cooperation, but certainly not thirty years, since Germany’s last strategic turning point, i.e. the fall of the Berlin Wall.”
Notes :
(1) See, for example, www.atlanticcouncil.org
(2) “In a major regional conflict-such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait-the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense. According to the results of a series of CSIS war games, the United States would likely run out of some munitions – such as long-range, precision-guided munitions – in less than one week in a Taiwan Strait conflict. “Quote from CSIS report referenced by Dr. Cook.
(3) Editor’s note: the expression “(Concerning) Military Matters” used here refers to the work of the Latin author Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus – De re militari – which dates back to the 4th century.
(4) On this subject, see www.europarl.europa.eu
A Brief – By Murielle Delaporte
Highlights of the iDeaS by COGES EVENTS e-conference on April 18, 2023 entitled “Capability cooperation: a tri-national perspective” – (NB: this summary concerns only the video part of this conference, which is also available in replay – in French only). Capability cooperation: a tri-national perspectiveThe podcast section, devoted to an interview of engineer general Walter Arnaud, has already been summarized in writing and available on this site. The war economy: rising power and reversibility. .As part of the “iDeaS By Coges Events” series organized and presented by Hawa-Léa Sougouna, Head of Conferences at GOGES, a panel on capability cooperation was held on April 18, bringing together two experts:
- on the one hand, Dr. Cynthia Cook, senior fellow at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) in Washington D.C., USA. A graduate of Harvard (PhD in Sociology) and the University of Pennsylvania (BS in Management from the Wharton School), she previously worked at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and the RAND Corporation. Dr. Cook also teaches at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and is a member of the editorial board of the Defense Acquisition Research Journal.
- And, on the other hand, American Ambassador James Bindenagel, Professor Emeritus at the University of Bonn in Germany: a graduate of the University of Illinois (MA in Public Service and BA in Political Science), Ambassador Bindenagel worked at Rockwell International, then at the US State Department. He contributed in particular to the negotiations leading to German reunification, while serving as deputy head of mission in the German Democratic Republic at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. His books include “International Security in the 21st Century: Germany’s International Responsibility” (2017; V&R Bonn) and “Germany from Peace to Power: Can Germany Lead in Europe Without Dominating It?” (2020; V&R Bonn).
The discussion was moderated by General John G. Ferrari (R), Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Also a graduate of the Wharton School (MBA in Management), the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (MA in Natural Resource Strategy) and West Point (BS in Computer Science), General (R) Ferrari served in the US Army for thirty-two years, including deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
The aim of this discussion was to compare the American approach to surge production capacity – with the specific emphasis placed on certain industrial capabilities by the Biden administration through the Defense Production Act, a law that dates back to the Korean War in 1950 and authorizes the executive branch to direct and prioritize national production for defense and security purposes – and the German approach of strategic breakthrough (“Zeitenwende”), alluding to German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz’s speech on February 22, 2022, in which he acknowledged a “change of era”.
If, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the return of high-intensity warfare to the heart of the Old Continent, there is on both sides the same political will to overhaul defense industrial capabilities towards greater joint cooperation, the impact on their respective production systems differs on the banks of the Potomac and on the banks of the Rhine.
The American approach: a targeted surge
For Dr. Cook, ” the definition of surge capacity in the U.S. context rests on the capacity of its industrial base “, meaning that there is no single model, but rather a wide variety of models ” system by system, contractor by contractor “. The process of ramping up production of Javelin missiles, for example, has nothing in common with the process of ramping up production of 155 mm artillery shells.Relaunching intensive production means revisiting the interactions of different levels of subcontractors and production facilities, whose supply chain is often international. This approach poses a number of challenges: “. the key is to send out a clear signal to companies so that they can produce on a large scale. But even once this message has been sent, a waiting period remains necessary to determine where, when and how to implement the power ramp-up. “Dr. Cook has identified three essential stages in the process:
- Decide on identified capability priorities;
- Provide an adequate budget to support development ;
- Establish contracts with manufacturers.
While Cynthia Cook notes that increased production is already being felt in certain sectors of the defense industry, such as 155 mm shells [Editor’s note: production rate was 14,000 shells per month last April, and should rise to 100,000 per month by 2025], she believes that despite a strong signal on the demand side, companies are still hesitant to invest without a guarantee of financing behind them. She highlights the following obstacles:
- the complexity of the US procurement system, which requires long contractual and financing cycles;
- a system of competition based on the best bid and pressure for low-cost production.
The optimization of previous decades led to a genuine revolution on the supply side, but the ability to deliver equipment on short notice was sacrificed on the altar of the ” just in time ” : “ faster production means more staff, more production space, new machine tools, and therefore more funding “Without even mentioning the time required for a change of scale, this is where the problem lies, as ” the major constraint is the inability of the ecosystem in general to meet this demand ”. The industries ” need the guarantee of a return on investment” and the longer-term visibility that only multi-year contracts can provide. ” Congress tends to fund on an annual basis so as not to tie the hands of future Congresses, except when it comes to funding platforms that take years to build, like aircraft carriers for example.”
Cynthia Cook notes, however, that a major new development in ammunition contracts, which are traditionally drawn up on an annual basis and regularly sacrificed for other priorities in military budgets, is the adoption for the first time of multi-year contracts in this sector. In response to a question from General Ferrari about the US declared intention to relocate the production of certain equipment with common standards to Central and Eastern Europe, in order to contribute to the creation of a European defense industrial base and standardization of the supply chain, Dr. Cook was cautious about a systematic approach to US imports of European weapons, and about the promises of ” off-shoring [Editor’s note: ” off-shoring “or ” friend-shoring ” is a concept developed in 2022 in the aftermath of Covid and Russian aggression in Ukraine by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and intended to strengthen the resilience of the ” supply chain “. It consists in deglobalizing and relocating production to countries sharing the same values (1)].
” One of the questions we need to ask ourselves when we talk about increasing power is whether we want to replenish the stocks of equipment transferred to Ukraine, whether we want to replenish with the same equipment we have been storing, or whether we want to buy new-generation equipment. “. For Cook, the answer is mixed, meaning that it makes sense to invest in the latter, while encouragingoffshoring for materials already produced worldwide, such as 155 mm shells. ” This requires political will on the part of the United States, but the question is whether Europe is prepared to invest accordingly to increase its munitions production capacity … “Ammunition has always been a minor financial priority and the scenarios developed by CSIS, where Dr Cook works, underline a great vulnerability in this area: ” in the event of a conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait, simulations tend to show that the armed forces would run out of long-range precision-guided munitions after one week of combat, while stocks of ammunitions in general would be exhausted after three weeks ” (2).
As far as obstacles to international production are concerned, there are a number of solutions already in place: the thorny issue of intellectual property, for example, can be the subject of a ” “ modular open system approach “, in which common interfaces enable companies wishing to work together on a joint capability to connect, while ensuring proper management of state-owned intellectual property.
For Cynthia Cook, what is fundamental is that the horror of the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of alliances and partnerships, which should not be underestimated and for which we ought to be grateful.
The German approach: the end of demilitarization for the benefit of European territorial defense
For Professor James Bindenagel, the speech on “Zeitenwende “, delivered by German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz in response to Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine marks a real turning point, as do two other key milestones in the history of contemporary Germany: the transition from Hitler’s regime to democracy in 1949, and the reunification of Germany with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.Since then, Germany has focused on reaping peace dividends by demilitarizing with the belief that ” if you worked with Russia, peace would be assured “. The invasion of Ukraine radically altered such a perception, and put an end to the vision that had prevailed for the last thirty years, or even the last seventy ones.
Chancellor Scholtz’s speech thus suggests a fundamental break in doctrine, based on the idea that ” peace can no longer be made with the Russians, but against them “and that Germany must be guarantor of European security “by working to increase Germany’s territorial defense, as well as that of Europe in cooperation with its European allies. Bindenagel notes that “the Dutch have already integrated part of their forces with the German armed forces “, while for Central European countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, homeland defense is inconceivable without German support. In his view, announcing a budget of one hundred billion euros for defense and respecting the NATO principle of 2% of GNP for defense is literally “earth shattering“. But there’s still a long way to go, as ” the Germans are in a very bad position, probably even worse than you can imagine, as they have to relearn the concept of high-intensity warfare “.
According to military experts, Germany would not even be able to mobilize ” a single operational brigade to defend its territory “and does not have a defense industrial base per seexplains James Bindenhagel, pointing out that even if the political will is there, and the budget too, ramping up capabilities will not happen overnight. However, he is confident in the success of such an ambition, stressing out the speed with which Berlin ended its excessive energy dependence on Russia, a transition characteristic of German decision-making: ” the way Germans make decisions is very slow, but once a decision is made, they do implement it. ”.
In fact, he underscores an already radical shift in public opinion, from the traditional anti-militarist stance of 60-70% of the population to a mere 40% unfavorable to “military matters” in barely a year (3).
In response to a question from General (R ) Ferrari as to Germany’s contribution to the standardization of European equipment, James Bindenhagel was optimistic about the new long-term funding allocated by the European Union in the form of Eurobonds in the wake of the Covid years, as part of the MFF (” Multiannual Financial Framework ” (4)): ” such an initiative could increase capabilities and support NATO with a better balance between Europe and the United States “.
The fundamental question addressed in conclusion by the former career diplomat is how to deter Russia from further aggression, and the answer is to back up the negotiations with adequate military support:” diplomacy without arms is like an orchestra without musical instruments”, he recalled, adding: “it will take a few years to strengthen transatlantic cooperation, but certainly not thirty years, since Germany’s last strategic turning point, i.e. the fall of the Berlin Wall.”
Notes :
(1) See, for example, www.atlanticcouncil.org
(2) “In a major regional conflict-such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait-the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense. According to the results of a series of CSIS war games, the United States would likely run out of some munitions – such as long-range, precision-guided munitions – in less than one week in a Taiwan Strait conflict. “Quote from CSIS report referenced by Dr. Cook.
(3) Editor’s note: the expression “(Concerning) Military Matters” used here refers to the work of the Latin author Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus – De re militari – which dates back to the 4th century.
(4) On this subject, see www.europarl.europa.eu