Hypersonic technologies: coercion vs defense

Presentation slide and participants at the COGES EVENTS conference on hypersonic technologies © MBDA

Summary – In an age of rapidly evolving technologies, hypersonic capabilities have changed the game. These advanced systems have the potential to revolutionize the balance of power between nations. At the COGES EVENTS e-conference entitled“Unveiling Hypersonic Challenges – Missiles and Countermeasures in Modern Military“, held on September 19, 2023, the experts Dr. Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Politico-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. (USA), Dr. Iain Boyd, Director of the Center for National Security Initiatives at the University of Colorado (USA), and Lionel Mazenq, in charge of hypersonic missile defense programs at MBDA (France), described the technical evolution and geopolitical impact of hypersonic technologies. The panel was moderated by Hawa-Léa Sougouna, Conference Program Manager for COGES Events.

The challenges of hypersonics: from missiles to countermeasures
By Dr. Iain Boyd

Dr. Boyd began his presentation by defining hypersonics as vehicles flying at speeds in excess of MACH 5 (3500 MPH). These technologies are used in space and defense, but their use could in future be extended to passenger aircraft.
For the University of Colorado professor, these technologies are game-changers for the following reasons:

1. their speed, which, in military terms, compresses the response time.
2. their altitude, which enables missiles to fly both low enough to avoid radar detection, and high enough to constrain the air traffic control needed to intercept them.
3. their ability to maneuver, which makes their trajectory unpredictable in flight.

The combination of these factors complicates tracking and targeting, which “makes them attractive on the offensive side, but very challenging on the defensive side.” Mr. Boyd also highlighted a number of specific challenges associated with the development of these technologies, which have come to light through failures such as the X15 test flight, such as thermal management and the propulsion system, or the development of mass production capacity at reasonable cost. For him, there’s still a long way to go in view of the difficulties and obstacles that are still unknown to us.

In a question at the end of the session, Dr. Boyd emphasized the importance of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) as a key factor: “AI is going to be important for everything. ” Explaining he stated that: “another aspect of hypersonic weapons is that they will be used in combination with other weapons, and it will take AI to understand the very complex battle scenes of the future and to be able to effectively defend against them.” “.

The American perception of the hypersonic threat in Russia and China: a capacity for coercion
By Dr. Richard Weitz

Underlining the fact that Russia, China and the USA are the major players for the time being, while various European countries, as well as Iran and North Korea, have expressed interest in acquiring hypersonic capabilities, Dr. Weitz asked what the point was of pursuing the hypersonic route. From his point of view, the advantages from a military point of view are as follows:

• Deterring attacks on national territory.
• Prevent military intervention in regional spheres of influence.
• Defeating enemy forces in wartime.
• In peacetime, to exert influence (the U.S. network of alliances is considered a fundamental strength of the liberal international order).
• Challenge the credibility of nuclear and conventional safety.
• Providing additional means of coercion
  For Russia and China, the benefits are obvious, as they complement their current offensive capabilities and offer a different threat profile.

Regarding Russia’s approach to hypersonic capabilities, Richard Weitz explained that research into these technologies actually began under the Soviet Union, with the initial aim of overcoming US missile defenses.

Today, while strategic deterrence is still relevant, Russia is concentrating on strengthening its regional combat capabilities. It currently equips many naval and air platforms in theaters of operation with hypersonic missiles – as we saw on the Ukrainian theatre – and could equip smaller coastal vessels and older-generation combat aircraft, in order to revitalize this type of equipment. Richard Weitz believes, however, that Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles in Ukraine does not change the situation as things stand.

In Russia, these missiles are considered first-strike weapons and are distinguished by the combination of hypersonic technology with nuclear warheads. The current Russian regime is constrained by cost and arms control limits, but strategically, the Russians would only need a few missiles of this type to penetrate Western defenses.

In contrast to Russia’s strategic long-range systems, China is focusing on the development of new hypersonic theater launch systems, thus rounding out the very broad and diverse range of missiles available to the Chinese army to strike military forces and installations in Asia.

The aim is to prevent U.S. military intervention in Beijing’s declared sphere of influence by weakening U.S. deterrence and defense capabilities, to the point where allies wonder whether the U.S. can – and will – defend them against these threats.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also refocused on strategic deterrence: while Russia and the United States were restricted by the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty, China was building intermediate-range missiles and equipping them with hypersonic technologies. The PLA’s aim would be to synchronize its attacks so as to be able to aim at distant targets with hypersonic systems – for example, US bases in Japan and Guam – while carrying out shorter-range strikes with other types of missile. The question is whether the APL is capable of tracking distant moving targets.

Faced with this threat, the United States is modernizing its national missile protection with the acquisition of a Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI), optimized to counter Russian, Chinese and North Korean ICBMs. This system is currently being developed by two competing contract teams, and progress has been greater than expected, with it due to be operational by 2027. U.S. modernization also includes strengthening CSIR sensor networks and space-based detection and warning systems.

MBDA’s vision of defense against the hypersonic threat
By Lionel Mazenq

Echoing Dr. Boyd, Lionel Mazenq defined hypersonic capabilities as a system combining an endo-atmospheric trajectory at a speed exceeding MACH 5 with continuous maneuvering capability for a substantial part of its flight. For him, the features that make this technology unique are :

1. Range: when traveling long distances in the atmosphere, the combination of speed and range is unique.
2. The flight envelope: this corresponds to the domains not covered by current endo-atmospheric defenses and to domains below high endo-atmospheric defenses, enabling relatively safe travel in these domains.
3. Trajectory: which allows a late detection.
4. The continued ability to maneuver at high altitude defies interception predictions.

These technologies are the result of a long evolution of research initiated in the 1940s, but four key developments have altered the environment in which the progress observed today can be seen:

• the development of insulating and heat-resistant materials;
• improved CFD (computational fluid dynamics) calculations;
• the development of compact and precise navigation solutions;
• the development of engagement chains over long distances in a short time, via the interconnectivity of UAVs and satellites.

For MBDA’s program manager, the main limitation today is the logistics chain for producing them.
Mr. Mazenq went on to explain that technology determines CONOPS by distinguishing between HGV and HCM:

• HGVs (” hypersonic glide vehicles ” or advanced hypersonic gliders) are maneuvering ballistic missiles well suited to a defense strategy aimed at blocking access to vast areas, but they are handicapped in terms of range.
• HCMs (” hypersonic cruise missiles ” or long-range cruise missiles) are similar to the old cruise missiles, with greater flexibility in defining trajectories, but less range at this stage.

Lionel Mazenq sees unpredictability as the main challenge posed by hypersonic threats. Indeed, depending on the distance between the areas to be protected and the size of these areas, the arrival of a single enemy threat maneuverable at high speed could be saturating. Shots may be needed from all defended areas, and interception could become untenable.

He described such a development as “a real burden for the sustainability for counter-hypersonic capability.”

For him, the key factors in protection against hypersonic missiles are the deployment of a network of sensors for monitoring and early warning, and the ability to anticipate the trajectory of the threat. The key to this system will be the ability to constantly track the target and recognize it accurately. Good high-altitude interception capability is also essential, to enable “take the decision as late as possible to have enough time to predict safely where the target will go. “.

A huge challenge for defense capabilities, these “have to be adapted to block these hypersonic threats with efforts in terms of sensors, networks, capabilities of interceptors “.